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ABSTRACT
The quality assurance program instituted by the Bureau of Ships in
1960 is intended to reduce the probability of material defects and failures
in the ships constructed, overhauled, and repaired in our Naval (and private)
shipyards. Particular emphasis is given to critical ship systems and to
critical industrial processes which could affect the safety or the mission
capabilities of the ships.
This paper represents a review of the quality assurance program as it
now exists in the Naval shipyards under the direction and guidance of the
Bureau of Ships. The principal elements of the program are discussed.
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THE QUALITY ASSURANCE PROBLEM AND DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS
In the past, the only proof that was expected to show that a ship met
its specifications or contractual requirements was the actual performance of
the ship. This may have been an adequate measure since the ships were design-
ed with large factors of safety and seldom, if ever, subjected to the maximum
designed characteristics.
Ever increasing demands for performance and reliability are being placed
on the modern Naval ship. The ship being built today can be expected to
operate under highly adverse conditions. The ability to perform, or even
survive, under these conditions must be built into the ship. It is neces-
sary to know beforehand that the ship will perform satisfactorily prior to
subjecting it to extreme conditions such as that encountered by a modern
submarine diving to design depth.
Therefore, it is mandatory that the fleet be provided with every practi-
cable assurance that the ships being built, overhauled, and repaired in our
shipyards (public and private) will perform safely, efficiently, and effective-
ly. The only known way of achieving this goal is through an effective quality
assurance program.

THE QUALITY ASSURANCE PROBLEM
Assurance that the quality and reliability requirements are achieved is
the responsibility of the organizations involved in creating a ship or other
end product. Here, it is important to differentiate between quality, re-
liability, and quality assurance. Quality is considered to be that which
is established by standard procedures and methods to result in a physical
product. Reliability is the probability that the product will perform its
intended function for a specified period of time under stated conditions.
Quality assurance, on the other hand, is comprised of all the actions
necessary to provide adequate confidence that the product will perform opera-
tionally as intended.
The Program
As used in this paper, quality assurance is a program. It is a detailed
program that is used to assure quality at each stage the product goes through
from conception to operational use. For a ship, this includes the processes
of design, procurement, material control, manufacturing/production, inspec-
tion, testing, feedback, and, finally, auditing to verify that these pro-
cesses are carried out as planned. It is necessary that the quality assur-
ance actions not only result in a ship that will perform satisfactorily and
reliably, but that they also result in objective evidence to provide ade-
quate confidence that the ship will do so.
In order to achieve the objectives of the quality assurance program,
it is first necessary to do the planning, organizing, staffing, establish-
ing of policies and procedures, training, and assigning of authority and
responsibility within the organizations involved. Since the initiation of
a quality assurance program in 1960, the Bureau of Ships and its family of




The purpose of this study was to review the quality assurance program
in its present state of development in the Naval shipyards under the direc-
tion and guidance of the Bureau of Ships and to determine where deficiencies
in management exist, if any.
Limitations .
The study reported here was conducted under the stress of limited time
and reference material as well as the problem of not being able to interview
a representative sample of the personnel directly involved. Therefore, the
reader is cautioned against considering this paper to be the result of a
complete study of the shipyard quality assurance program.
Summary .
The fleet deserves the assurance that the modern Naval ship, after
completion of shipyard work, will perform satisfactorily, reliably, and
safely. The quality assurance program recently instituted by the Bureau of
Ships is intended to provide such assurance. This paper represents a review
of the quality assurance program as it now exists in our Naval shipyards
under the direction and guidance of the Bureau of Ships.

DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS
Various definitions exist for many of the words and terms used in quality
assurance. The following glossary defines the pertinent quality assurance
terms as they are used in various Bureau of Ships directives and U. S. Govern-










A nominal value expressed in terms of per-
cent defective, or defects per hundred
units, whichever is applicable, for a given
group of defects of a product. (MIL-STD
109A)
The analysis and evaluation of procedures,
methods, and records to determine compli-
ance with existing requirements. (Derived
from "surveillance' 1 and "verification"
definitions in MIL-STD 109A)
A supplier's statement or record of quality,
which includes objective evidence result-
ing from his inspection and testing of the
product, that may be accepted as an ele-
ment in determining whether the product is
in conformity with the contract. A certi-
ficate of compliance that contains no
actual test, inspection, or other verifi-
able date is unacceptable. (BuShips Instruc-
tion 4355.13)
A physical, chemical, visual, or any other
measurable property of a product or mater-
ial. (MIL-STD 109A)
A recognized design process of surveillance
at various steps in plan production. (Ac-
cepted industrial usage.)
A list of possible defects of the unit of
product, classified according to their
importance. Defects shall normally be
grouped into the classes of critical, major,
or minor defects; but, defects may be group-
ed into other classes, if applicable. (MIL-
STD 109A).

Component A self-contained combination of parts,
subassemblies, or assemblies, which per-
form a distinctive function in the over-
all operation of an equipment. (Used




The probability that a given statement is
correct, or, the chance that a given value
lies between two confidence limits. (The
confidence interval.) (MIL-STD 721 Navy)
A defect that judgment and experience in-
dicate could result in hazardous or un-
safe conditions for individuals using or
maintaining the product; or, for major end
item units of products such as ships, a
defect that could prevent performance of
their tactical function. (MIL-STD 109A)
Defect
Examination
Any nonconformance of the unit of product
with specified requirements. (MIL-STD 109A)
An element of inspection consisting of in-
vestigation without the use of special
laboratory appliances or procedures, of
suppliers and services to determine con-
formance to those specified requirements
which can be determined by such investiga-
tions. Examination is generally nondestruc-
tive and includes, but is not limited to
visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile, gusta-
tory, and other investigations; simple
physical manipulation; gaging; and measure-
ment. (MIL-STD 109A)
Failure The inability of a system, sub-system, com-
ponent, or part to perform its required
function. (MIL-STD 721 Navy)
Failure rate The number of failures per unit time.
(MIL-STD 721 Navy)
Inherent reliability The actual reliability achieved during the
design phase. (MIL-STD 721 Navy)
In-process inspection Inspection which is performed during the
manufacturing or repair cycle in an effort
to prevent defects from occurring, and to
inspect the characteristics and attributes
which are not capable of being inspected










The examination (including testing) of
supplies and services (including, when ap-
plicable, raw materials, documents, data,
components, and intermediate assemblies)
to determine whether the supplies and
services conform to technical requirements.
(MIL-STD 109A)
Recorded data showing the results of an
inspection with appropriate identifying
information as to the characteristic or
class of characteristics inspected.
(MIL-STD 109A)
The probability (when maintenance action
is initiated under stated conditions) of
restoring a system to its specified opera-
tional conditions within a specified total
downtime. (MIL-STD 721 Navy)
Procedures that can be carried out by the
equipment operators for keeping equipment
in, and restoring it to, working order.
(Accepted military usage.) A defect, other
than critical, that could result in fail-
ure, or materially reduce the usability
of the product for its intended purpose.
(MIL-STD 109A)
The mean operating time between failures,
during which time the item performs as
specified. (MIL-STD 721 Navy)
The mean operating time to failure, beyond
which point the item becomes expendable.
(MIL-STD 721 Navy)
Minor defect A defect that does not materially reduce
the usability of the unit or product for
its intended purpose; or, is a departure
from established standards having no signi-
ficant bearing on the effective use or
operation of the unit. (MIL-STD 109A)
Objective quality
evidence
Any statement of fact pertaining to the
quality of a product or services based on
observations, measurement, or tests which
can be fully verified. Evidence must be
expressed in terms of specific quality re-
quirements or characteristics. These
characteristics are identified in drawings,
specifications, and other documents which















The probability that the system will give
specified performance for the duration of
a mission when used in the manner and for
the purpose intended. (MIL-STD 721 Navy)
The likelihood of occurrence of a parti-
cular event. The ratio of the number of
ways an event can actually occur to the
total number of possibilities. (MIL-
STD 721 Navy)
Quality assurance comprises a planned and
systematic pattern of ail actions neces-
sary to provide adequate confidence that
the product will perform satisfactorily
in service (MIL-STD 109A)
A management function whereby control of
quality of raw or produced material is
exercised for the purpose of preventing
production of defective material. (MIL-
STD 109A)
A compilation of inspection or quality
control records for an item, or group of
items, suitable for evaluation on a time
series basis. (MIL-STD 109A)
The procedure used to select items from an
inspection lot so that each item in the lot
has an equal chance of being included in
the sample. (MIL-STD 109A)
Probability that a system, sub-system, com-
ponent, or part will perform its intended
function for a specified period of time
under stated conditions. (MIL-STD 721
Navy)
A level of reliability expressed in an
equipment specification as a design require-
ment (MIL-STD 721 Navy)
Tests designed to measure the level and
uniformity of reliability. (MIL-STD
721 Navy)
One or more units of product selected at





A statement of the sample size or sizes
to be used and the associated acceptance
and rejection criteria. (MIL-STD 109A)
1) The continuing analysis and evaluation of
records, methods, and procedures including
the act of verification to assure conform-
ance with technical requirements.
2) A system whereby supplies and equipment in
storage are subjected to, but not limited
to, cyclic, scheduled, and special inspec-
tion and continuous action to assure that
material is maintained in a ready- for-
issue condition. (MIL-STD 109A)
Testing An element of inspection which generally
denotes the determination by technical
means, of the properties or elements of
supplies, or components thereof, and in-
volves the application of established





The entity of product inspected in order
to determine its classification as defec-
tive or non-defective. This may be a
single article, a pair, a set, a length,
an area, a volume, a component of an end
product, or the end product itself. It
may or may not be the same as the unit of
purchase, supply, production, or shipment.
(MIL-STD 109A)
The experienced reliability resulting from
in-service maintenance and performance
application factors. (Industrial usage.)
A combination of monitoring actions, in-
spection, or both, for the purpose of
determining compliance of the contractor
with the provisions of the contract, and
evaluating the effectiveness of his in-




HISTORY OF QUALITY ASSURANCE
The history of quality assurance as now perceived in the Navy goes back
about 20 years. Examination of World War II and post-war equipment records
indicated almost unbelievably low reliability - particularly for electronics
equipment. As a result, the Department of Defense conferred with industry
and concluded that greater quality assurance could be and must be attained
in military equipment.
INITIAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIONS
The present quality assurance program evolved from a series of Depart-
ment of Defense directives. The directive which laid much of the ground-
work is quoted in part as follows:
2. Quality assurance concepts . Quality assurance concept is pre-
dicated upon the fact that:
a. Responsibility rests upon contractors and producing activities
for controlling product quality and for offering to military
departments for acceptance only those items or lots of items
considered by them to conform to contractual requirements ....
b. Responsibility rests with the military departments for deter-
minint that contractual requirements have been complied with
prior to the acceptance of the product.
3. Quality assurance policies . Determination of conformance of pro-
ducts to contract requirements shall be made on the basis of
objective evidence of quality and quantity. The Government in-
spector shall make optimum use of quality data generated by con-
tractors in determining acceptability of supplies to the extent
that the contractor's quality data are available and reliable, as
determined by government inspection. Such data shall be used to
adjust the amount of Government inspection of the product for
acceptance purposes to the degree consistent with proper assurance
that the supplies accepted conform to the quality requirements
established by procurement documents. .. .It must be borne in mind
that the Government inspector is responsible for quality and quan-
tity of the products of which he has inspection cognizance.
Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction 4155.6,




This was followed in May, 1957 by another Department of Defense directive
which defined inspection and verification procedures as follows:
Factors influencing extent of Government inspection . The extent of
Government inspection to verify the supplier's compliance with the
quality assurance provisions of the commodity specification and
with other technical requirements of the contract shall be adjusted
to reflect the following factors:
a) the possible effect of failure of the item on the safety
of personnel;
b) the tactical or strategic importance of the item;
c) the complexity of the item and the need for high reliability
of the item and its components;
d) the pertinence, completeness and reliability of the supplier's
inspection records;
e) the previous quality history of the supplier's product;
f) the quantity and technical specialties of available Govern-
ment inspection manpower;
g) technical importance of the item; and
h) the unit cost of the item.
Standard procedures for Government verification inspection . To promote
uniformity in Government verification inspection of suppliers' compli-
ance with the quality assurance provisions of specifications and other
technical requirements of the contract, the following aspects of veri-
fication inspection shall be treated in accordance with the standard
procedures contained in the enclosure:
a) review and evaluation of the supplier's inspection procedures;
b) inspection and calibration of the supplier's gages, measur-
ing and test equipment;
c) examination of the supplier's inspection records; and
d) performance of product verification inspection by the Govern-
ment . *
BUREAU OF SHIPS ACTIONS
In 1958, the Navy became vitally interested in the problem when the
Bureau of Ships' Inspector General (Rear Admiral Logan McKee) indicated that
there was a great need for increased quality and reliability assurance in the
work of the Naval Shipyards. A direct result of the McKee Report was the
establishment of the Ship Cost Analysis Panel (SCAP) . This panel concluded
2
Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction 4155.8.
Department of Defense Procurement Inspection Policies and Procedures for Items





There is presently no attempt made to relate cost of quality to value
of quality. There is no attempt made to determine either the cost or
the value of quality. There is, therefore, no real knowledge of whether
shipyards are spending far too little or far too much to achieve the
quality production they do, or even whether that quality is about right,
is too high, or too low. In summary, no real attention has been paid
to the whole question of quality controls, and in particular to an evalua-
tion of the minimum overall cost of quality.
Significant progress has been made in this area since the first formal
3directive was issued by the Bureau of Ships in 1960. The quality assur-
ance program, as it relates to organization, policy, definitions, costs and
contracts, has been determined and essential implementing directives have
been issued. Concepts and philosophies of the quality assurance function have
been disseminated. Detailed specifications for specific shipyard processes
have been published. Guidelines for such areas as reliability, data feedback,
audits, inspection, and motivation have also been covered by Bureau of Ships
directives. But the fact remains that this is a relatively new and extremely
complex program that will require an extraordinary effort to achieve complete
implementation in the organizations concerned with the construction, overhaul,
and repair of Naval ships.
3
Department of the Navy, Bureau of Ships Instruction 4355.14, Quality
Assurance Policy . (Washington: 8 November i960).

CHAPTER III
THE QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM
Quality assurance has been defined as comprising a planned and system-
atic pattern of all actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that the
product will perform satisfactorily in service. In order to be effective,
the objectives of a quality assurance program must include:
1) systematic planning, integration and performance of actions
necessary for attainment of confidence in product quality;
2) development, implementation, and improvement of work methods
and techniques;
3) effective communication of quality requirements and informa-
tion throughout the organization;
4) achievement of requisite product quality and reliability
assurance at a reasonable cost. The costs involved in assuring the quality
of the product must be justifiable; and
5) delivery of a reliable product which meets the operational
requirements of the user.
This study develops concepts of the management functions required to
achieve the above objectives. Along with statements of these concepts are
indicated the actions taken, or directed, in the Naval shipyards to imple-
ment programs which will assure the quality of the work on the ships deliver-
ed to the fleet.
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PLANNING FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE
Past practice has been informal , unrecorded , and unsystematic assurance
of quality in the shipyard functions of design, procurement, and production.
However, as the implications of mistakes become more costly, there is need
for predetermined and systematic definition of what will be checked, who will
do the checking, what records will be kept, and what the results of analysis
of records mean in terms of corrective action.
The Need For A Plan
In order to achieve effective quality assurance, the first and most
important step is the development of a formal plan which unites the efforts
of the organizations and personnel toward the common goal of adequate quality.
In this light, the Chief, Bureau of Ships has directed that the Bureau of
Ships and its field activities "shall be responsible for developing an
integrated plan for systematic, economical, and constructive assurance of
quality through all the operations pertinent to ships and their equipment. 81
In its broadest terms, the concept of planning is applied to all organi-
zational levels from the manager down to the craftsman on the job and implies
a systematic and practical approach to any task intended to be implemented
economically and expeditiously. Quality assurance planning should define the
pattern of decisions, responses to the decisions, and assurances that the
decisions and responses are effective. This will provide a sequential system
of steps, actions, or events for achieving the goal of stated quality.
Systematic planning for effective quality assurance must provide answers
Department of the Navy, Bureau of Ships Instruction 4355.14, Quality
Assurance Policy (Washington: 8 November
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to the following questions as a minimum:
1) What degree of quality assurance is necessary?
2) What quality assurance measures are required, what is
necessary to accomplish these objectives, and what results are anticipated?
3) Where are assurance measures required, where should the work
be performed, and where is the required information to be obtained?
4) When and where should assurance efforts be reduced or in-
creased, changed, or eliminated?
5) Who should perform the work, who is responsible for correc-
tive action, and who is performing effectively or ineffectively.
6) How is the work to be performed, how can the process be im-
proved, how can costs be reduced, and how can reliability be improved?
7) What degree of training is required for all persons concern-
ed with quality assurance?
8) Are agreed standards and procedures being complied with and,
finally, is the program effective?
Establishing the Quality Assurance Plan
Determining the necessary degree of quality assurance or the level of
essentiality of the ship, system, or equipment is the first element to be
considered in setting specific objectives of the quality assurance program.
The general level of essentiality may be determined by the Chief of Naval
Operations* Ship Characteristics Board when promulgating the ship's proposed
mission along with the design characteristics. However, standards for
detailed determinations of the degree of quality assurance necessary for
specific systems and equipment must be decided at the Bureau of Ships/Bureau
of Naval Weapons level of design and material responsibility. Final
14

responsibility for specific communication of essentiality levels rests with
the designated activity responsible for developing or approving working and
production plans based upon contract specifications and contract plans issued
by the Bureau of Ships.
With the level of essentiality set, the elements of the quality assur-
ance program may be detailed. The plan should reflect at least the follow-
ing:
1) Identification and analysis of each operation which contri-
butes to the quality of the end product.
2) Establishment of job processes, procedures and controls which
are necessary to secure the requisite quality.
3) Setting up inspection, test, and audit procedures.
4) Establishment of reliable feedback procedures.
5) Training and qualification of personnel.
6) Procedures for reporting deficiencies and taking corrective
action.
Once these broad elements have been decided, they may be broken down
into simple procedures - ideally, each consisting of one job done by one
man at one place. The responsibility for each task should be defined and
the man who is to carry out the task must be informed and understand his
responsibilities.
Where possible, master charts of responsibilities and schedules should
be prepared to serve both as a plan and as a managerial control. This pro-
cedure provides a checklist for inspection and testing and may well reveal
where control has been lacking in the past. The plan for audit of critical
areas will be facilitated by such a master checklist.
15

Thus, the planned sequence of quality assurance events should parallel
and be integrated with organizational planning to establish the quality
assurance prerequisites of design, procurement, production, and inspection
events and to allow adequate time in the schedule to take the actions neces-
sary to achieve the requisite quality.
16

ORGANIZATION FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE
Fundamental to effective planning, production, and control is effective
organization. This applied to quality assurance as well as other activities
to be carried out by any organization of people. Effective organization
defines clear-cut lines of authority and responsibility for planning and
carrying out a program.
The Assurance Engineering Office .
Evolving from a similar unit established within the Bureau of Ships
in 1960, the present Assurance Engineering Office (Code 609) provides con-
sulting, staff planning and technical advice to the Chief of the Bureau and
to the Assistant Chiefs in their areas of cognizance, on matters related to
policies, plans, programs, and procedures affecting the value and quality of
ships and their material. The Assurance Engineering Office coordinates the
guidance and direction of the Naval shipyards in regard to quality assurance
matters and monitors the programs set up at these activities. Detailed plans
for adapting the policies of the Bureau of Ships must be made within the
shipyard organizations.
The Shipyard Quality Assurance Organization .
The first formal requirement for establishment of a quality assurance
organization within the Naval shipyards was directed by the Chief, Bureau
of Ships in July 1961. Under this organizational policy, the Head of the
Quality Assurance Division was responsible to the shipyard Production Officer.
A change in the Standard U. S. Naval Shipyard Regulations was directed by
the Chief, Bureau of Ships in September 1963 which provided for establishment




the Shipyard Commander. The associated statement of duties and responsibil-
ities of the Quality and Reliability Assurance Department are contained in
Appendix I.
Another change, however, was effected in October 1963 which gave the
Shipyard Commander the option to continue the quality assurance function as
3
a division of the Production Department. If this option is exercised, it
is then required that the Head of the Quality Assurance Division be assigned
an additional billet "on the staff of the Shipyard Commander for purposes of
advising on quality assurance matters."
The penultimate decision which placed the quality assurance function
at the departmental level of the Naval shipyard hierarchy was based on the
need for strengthened organization for assuring quality and reliability and
to minimize the probability of organizational conflict relative to continued
implementation of the quality assurance program. Given the option, a Ship-
yard Commander's decision to retain the quality assurance function at the
divisional level would appear to deemphasize the role of this function and
temper its effectiveness potential.
The quality assurance organizations now established in the Naval ship-
yards vary in size from about 500 personnel down to less than 100 personnel.
The Mare Island and Portsmouth Naval Shipyards, being new construction ship-
yards for submarines, have the largest quality organizations - which emanated
2
Department of the Navy, Bureau of Ships Notice 5450. 14A Change Trans-
mittal, Change 22 to BUSHIPS INST 5450. 14A of 18 March 1958, Standard U. S .
Naval Shipyard Regulations . (Washington: 11 September 1963).
3
Department of the Navy, Bureau of Ships Notice 5450. 14A Change Trans-
mittal. Change 23 to BUSHIPS INST 5450. 14A of 18 March 1958, Standard U. S .
Naval Shipyard Regulations. (Washington: 17 October 1963).
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from large Inspection Divisions in being prior to the initiation of the
quality assurance program.
Feigenbaum contends that there are two basic principles that sum up the
concepts important to organizing for quality control:
The first principle is that quality is everybody's job in a business.
In defiance of this principle, many businesses over the years have
attempted to centralize their company quality responsibility by organiz-
ing a function whose job has been handsomely described as "responsibility
for all factors affecting product quality." These experiments had a
life span of as long as 6 to 9 months, that is, when the job incumbent
had the advantage of a strong stomach, a rhinoceros hide, and a well-
spent sober boyhood. Others not similarly endowed did not last the
6 months.
The simple fact of the matter is that the marketing man can best
evaluate customer's quality preferences. The design engineer is the
only man who can effectively establish specification quality levels.
The shop supervisor is the individual who can best concentrate on the
building of quality.
Total-quality-control programs thus require, as an initial step,
top management's reemphasis of the respective quality responsibilities
and accountabilities of all company employees in new-design control, in
incoming-material control, in product control, and in special process
studies.
The second principle of total-quality-control organization is a
corollary to this first one: because quality is everybody's job in a
business, it may become nobody's job . Thus, the second step reouired
in total quality programs becomes clear. Top management must recognize
that the many individual responsibilities for quality will be exercised
most effectively when they are buttressed and serviced by a well-organ-
ized, genuinely modern management function whose only area of specializa -
tion is product quality, whose only area of operation is in the quality-
control jobs, and whose only responsibilities are to be sure that the
products shipped are right- -and at the right quality cost .
The two basic responsibilities of this total-quality-control func-
tion may be formally stated as first , to provide quality assurance for
the business 's products, and second , to assist in assuring optimum quality
costs for those products.
4
A. V. Feigenbaum, Total Quality Control (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., 1961), p. 49, 50.
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DESIGN ASPECTS OF QUALITY ASSURANCE
Design is a dec is ion-making process which plays a most important part
in the quality of the end product. The multitudinous decisions of design
functions are represented in their output of detailed construction plans with
bills of material, identification and inspection plans, tests and trial forms,
technical manuals, lists of repair parts, etc. This dissemination of de-
cisions is wholly as important as the decisions themselves. The implementa-
tion of these decisions in actual construction or over-haul, operation, and
maintenance will be effective only if these decisions are transmitted clearly,
definitively, and completely.
Design Functions .
Basically, it is design's task to develop "paper" details which satisfy
the contract design. The Bureau of Ships' responsibility is to ensure that
the contract design satisfies the assigned characteristics just as it is the
Ship's Characteristics Board's responsibility to see that the characteristics
satisfy the intended mission of the ship determined by the Chief of Naval
Operations. Completing this loop, it is the right and responsibility of
design to bring to the Bureau's attention any deficiencies in the contract
design. This represents a quality assurance check on the contract design
just as the development of the contract design is a quality assurance check
on the characteristics, etc.
The critical factors or level of essentiality of the particular product
or ship must be recognized within the quality assurance system. Necessarily,
the first to recognize the critical characteristics is the ship or equipment
designer who must identify and communicate these parameters and establish the
criteria for procurement, production, inspection and test.
20

The quality of design is dependent upon the capability and experience
of the designer, the amount of deviation from past practices, and the degree
of pushing of the state-of-the-art. Assurance of design quality is achieved
through the use of models and mockups, design checks and reviews, engineering
checks and reviews of completed plans, design review and approval by other
agencies, preinstallation tests of new design hardware, etc.
The real proof of design quality, however, comes in the actual procure-
ment, manufacturing, construction and inspection and test processes - and
finally in the actual operation of the end product. These phases involve
quality control to ensure that the product is built and tested to the design
outputs. This is an important quality assurance check on design. Any defi-
ciencies in the product not attributable to lack of quality control during
production must be fed back to design for immediate correction as well as
for development of basic know-how on which future design decisions will be
made.
It is design's job to select material, fabrication methods, inspection
techniques and tests to achieve a desired end result at minimum cost, assum-
ing good workmanship. So, in addition to feedback of design defects, it is
also essential that they be appraised of new materials, new manufacturing
processes and new inspection techniques that are now available and can do
the job as well or better or at a lesser expense of labor, materials, or
time or which improves the chances of success. For examples, Dallinger and
Goode indicated that a review of all non-destructive test acceptance stand-
ards is needed to:
(a) Insure that the cost for obtaining each quality level specified
can be justified by the increase in reliability and the reduc-




(b) Insure that the state of the art can support the requirements
for manufacturing and testing.
(c) Insure they are sufficiently definitive and technically accurate
for the end item use.
(d) Insure the standard is capable of uniform interpretation by
various unrelated activities including INSMATS.
Planning and Estimating Tasks .
Following design action, the Planning and Estimating Division of the
shipyard must develop job orders which clearly delineate the way the job
is to be done to meet specifications, including those prescribing quality.
The job orders must reference the applicable process instructions and methods
standards and define the inspections and tests to be performed and the
quality assurance records to be kept. Procurement documents must result in
material of the quality required by specifications. Conflict between plans,
job orders, and specifications should be referred back to design for resolu-
tion.
J. F. Dallinger and 0. R. Goode, "Quality Control in Shipbuilding,"




Failure of piping exposed to sea pressure has presented a significant
hazard to more than one submerged submarine and is generally believed to
have been the cause of the loss of THRESHER in April 1963. Such critical
factors as represented by this example must be recognized within the quality
assurance system.
The Three Levels of Essentiality .
Having recognized this problem in 1961, the Bureau of Ships established
three levels of essentiality for piping systems which reflect their relative
significance in terms of the ship's mission and safety. Initially, these
levels were established for use in assuring accurate material identification
of piping and verification of correct installations through checks of identi-
fication markings against specifications. The levels of essentiality have
been applied to fabrication processes, inspection, the actions of supervision,
training, and audit inspection of piping systems.
a. Level I encompasses those piping systems in which:
(1) Stress levels, such as arise from temperature, pressure,
vibration, or shock, create a high probability of failure
if incorrect materials are used and -
(2) Failures would significantly and directly for combatant
ships, (a) reduce the ships primary combat effectiveness,
and/or (b) jeopardize the safety of ship or numbers of
personnel, particularly through release of stored energy,
toxic and/or hazardous fluids/vapors...
b. Level II encompasses those systems in which:
(1) Stress levels, such as arise from temperature, pressure,
vibration, or shock, create a high probability of failure
if incorrect materials are used and -
(2) Failure would (a) for combatant ships, decrease the
ability to sustain the intended efficiency, accuracy and
reliability of systems essential to their combat effective-
ness (b) for auxiliary ships, significantly and directly
reduce their primary mission effectiveness.
c. Level III encompasses those piping systems in which failure due to
incorrect material is unlikely or will have little or no





Level I represents those systems for which maximum confidence is required
and derived from as firm a base of factual information as is possible. It
involves special designation of materials on all documentation, 100% verifica-
tion by physical or chemical tests of the correctness of material and its
identification by markings during fabrication and installation, specified
process and process control, training and qualification of personnel involv-
ed, and periodic audits. In summary, Level I requires a complete and docu-
mented quality assurance effort.
Level II systems require control similar to that for Level I except that
less verification of material properties is appropriate provided there is
confidence in the vendor, although the shipyard is still responsible for the
correctness of subcontracted material.
Level III applies to systems which utilize material whose identity will
generally be assumed correct unless there are indications to the contrary or
no identification markings exist. Inexpensive checks are recommended to
assure that the material is correct in those cases where errors in material
would be expensive to correct.
Modified Policy on Levels of Essentiality .
In September 1964, the Bureau of Ships modified its policy on levels
of essentiality by stating:
The shipbuilding may classify piping systems and designate parts
as either Level I or Level III. If only these two levels are used,
those systems and parts formerly designated as Level II shall be up-
graded to meet Level I requirements.'
c.
Department of the Navy, Bureau of Ships Instruction 4410.17, Material
Identification System (Part I: Piping Materials) (Washington: 22 June 1961).
Department of the Navy, Bureau of Ships letter serial 609.1-275,
Bureau of Ships Instruction 4410.17, Material Identification system :
Clarification of Application (Washington: 21 September 1964).
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This modified policy has resulted in confusion in the application of
levels of essentiality in the shipyards. Some shipyards apply only two
levels where others use the original three. One shipyard is reported to
have gone so far as to adopt a policy of Level I material and "all-other-
material." One might question what that shipyard does when it comes across
a plan indicating Level II material is to be used. The problems come to
light when there is an exchange of plans, procurement specifications, and
material between the shipyards. All personnel concerned must be made aware
of these differences to reduce the impact of the confusion factor and to
prevent errors in material procurement, inspection, and application.
Even with the guidelines provided relative to piping systems, there
is not uniformity among the shipyards in the assignment of essentiality levels
to these systems. Less guidance has been provided in the areas of machinery,




Feedback is the information system which is an essential part of the
quality assurance program. Feedback indicates the quality or reliability
of an equipment or system at the time of receipt of the material from another
source, at the time of inspection or test after installation, or under daily
operation in the fleet.
Ideally, the feedback system represents a closed loop intelligence
system that links together the various organizational components of the
total quality assurance system. Through this loop, specific quality results
may be measured, analyzed and then fed back for use in replanning. This is
extremely important since feedback provides the basis for improvement of the
design, procurement, production, inspection, and audit phases of the quality
assurance program.
To be effective, the information system must be complete. Unless areas
of unsatisfactory quality are reported to the persons responsible for the
state of quality of the product, it can be anticipated that necessary im-
provements will not be effected in current and future actions relative to
that product or those similar in nature to it.
Periodic review of the quality feedback system is necessary to keep it
current in meeting the changing needs of the organizations concerned. Be-
sides identifying new organizational components that require certain quality
information, attention must be given to eliminating distributions whereby




Currently, there are four formal feedback systems which provide failure
information on equipment and systems in the fleet.
1) Casualty Reports (CASREPTS) are reports of significant material
casualties or failures submitted by the Commanding Officer (or Officer-in-
Charge) of a ship or station. Those casualties which are serious enough to
affect the ability of the command to carry out its mission are reported by
Naval message. Less significant casualties are reported by speedletter.
Copies of these CASREPTS are forwarded to the material bureau concerned for
collection, classification, review, and analysis by designated offices or
codes. These codes are responsible for coordinating corrective action where
the bureau is directly involved. These codes also distribute failure data
to the responsible Navy industrial activity or inspection office (in the case
of contractor material) for corrective actions in the event that poor work-
manship or lack of adequate quality assurance is indicated.
2) Form NAVSHIPS 3621 is used to report failures of shipboard
mechanical, electrical, and hull equipment which are under the cognizance of
Q
the Bureau of Ships. This failure report is required to be submitted after
repairs are made and generally provides sufficient detail for analysis and
decision as to the soundness of design and quality assurance.
3) Form BuShips 10550-1 is used to report failures of selected
9
electronics equipment under the cognizance of the Bureau of Ships. Associ-
ated with this is Form BuShips 10550.14 which is used to report accurate
Q
Department of the Navy, Bureau of Ships Instruction 9000. 13A, Failures
of Bureau of Ships Mechanical, Electrical, and Hull Equipment, Reporting of
(Form NAVSHIPS 3621) (Washington: 24 November 1959).
9
Department of the Navy, Bureau of Ships Instruction 10550.73, Revised




operational time based data for reliability, maintainability, and avail-
ability figures of merit and for failure and replacement rate calculations
10
of the selected electronics equipment.
4) The Standard Navy Maintenance Management System (SNMMS)
is currently being implemented in the fleet under the direct sponsorship of
the Chief of Naval Operations and has as its objective "the improvement of
the material readiness of the fleet through improved management of mainten-
11
ance and material functions." With a goal for completion in 1966, this
system is expected to provide the basis for uniform planned maintenance of
fleet equipment, the collection of maintenance data in a form that will
facilitate machine processing, and the establishment of an activity capable
of processing and analyzing the maintenance information received. The ana-
lyzed data will then be utilized in providing feedback and responsible assist-
ance to the operating forces. System reliability, failure rates based on
operating time and inspection periods, and other maintenance and material
matters will be available in the storage of the data processing and ana-
lysis system.
At the shipyard level, the Bureau of Ships has set forth the require-
ments for inspection and audit of the effectiveness of the control of
12
quality. " Defect reports which result are fed into the in-yard feedback
system for the purpose of assuring correction of deficiencies found and to
10
Ibid .
Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
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initiate actions to prevent unnecessary recurrence.
The implications of the footnoted directives is that a system of
casualty, failure, and defect reporting has been established including assign-
ment of responsibility. If the bureaus and shipyards are to provide reliable
corrective action to the fleet, all reporting activities in turn must provide
accurate, complete, and timely reports. Except for serious casualties,
reports of material failures and defects tend to be sporadic in many cases.
This can be attributed to past instances where no positive corrective action
was ever taken on reports of significant failures. But, in turn, those re-
ports that are made must be delivered to the individuals cognizant over
quality in each case. And, finally, after intelligent analysis and decision
making, these individuals must initiate and follow-up preventive actions.




No basic materials originate in the shipyard. All materials, raw or
finished, must be obtained from outside sources. Approximately 50 percent
of an average ship is fabricated from raw materials and 50 percent is built
from finished components. The assurance of quality of these materials is
vital to the overall quality assurance program in the shipyard. The quality
of the incoming material depends upon the adequacy of the procurement docu-
ments and the degree of inspection used to confirm vendor compliance with
these documents.
Procurement Documents .
Procurement documents for material should contain the following informa-
tion:
1) technical characteristics;
2) applicable Government specifications;
3) process standards;
4) special specification requirements; and
5) quality assurance provisions including the level of
confidence required.
Technical and quality assurance review of procurement documents should
include such points as the level of essentiality, clear definition of toler-
ances and other acceptance standards, inspection points and tests, process
approvals, personnel qualification, material certification and markings,
extent of source inspection, and the validity of the referenced documents.
Incorporation of these requirements will eliminate many potential causes of
rejections when the material is received. In some cases, it is possible to
prepare a separate quality assurance specification that can be included in
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all applicable purchase orders. The use of such a quality assurance specifica-
tion will condense the many varied documents that have to be referenced and
make it easier for the vendor's quality assurance organization to ensure that
all requirements are complied with.
Vendor Quality Assurance Programs .
Where the material being procured is of Level I essentiality, it is
important that a pre-award survey of the vendor be made by quality assurance
personnel to ensure that the vendor can 9 in fact, meet the requirements of
the procurement document. The pre-award survey is a review of the vendor's
overall quality control procedures and performance. Such a survey also in-
cludes special requirements of radiography, heat treating, and laboratory
facilities that may be peculiar to the particular procurement.
Military Specification MIL-Q-9858A, "Quality Control System Require-
ments," where included as a requirement in the procurement document, requires
the vendor to establish a quality assurance program to assure compliance
with the requirements of the procurement. Military Specification MIL-I-45208A,
"Inspection System Requirement," establishes minimum requirements for con-
tractor 1 inspections and tests necessary to substantiate product conformance
to specifications. This specification is used for contracts where the pro-
duct complexity does not necessitate the application of MIL-Q-9858A. NAVEXOS
P-1034, "Manual for Source Inspection and Administration of Navy Procurement,"
also specifies contractual requirements for establishment of a formal in-
spection or quality control system. These documents also provide methods
for evaluating the effectiveness of the vendor's quality assurance system.
The Inspector of Naval Material and the Supervisor of Shipbuilding
organizations are the Government activities which normally carry out the
pre-award survey, inspection, and verification functions where source
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inspection is necessary. The Supervisor of Shipbuilding carries out these
functions in the cases of material orders from private shipbuilding contract-
ors and the Inspector of Naval Material does so for material and equipment
vendors
.
Since, generally, the source inspection is carried out by a Government
activity other than the shipyard, it is doubly important that the procure-
ment document be clear and complete. Where special processes or techniques
are involved, such as the welding of HY-80 steel, it may be necessary to
arrange for Inspector of Naval Material inspectors to attend special schools.
In other cases, it may be necessary for shipyard quality assurance personnel
to visit the Inspector of Naval Material to ensure full understanding of
the intent of the requirements of the procurement and the application of
the end product. In all instances of critical material, there should be an
open line of communication to preclude misunderstanding on the part of either
the vendor or the source inspector.
Material Receipt Inspection .
In addition to the material that the shipyard purchases, the shipyard
receives material purchased by the Bureau of Ships, the various supply
systems within the Department of Defense, and other private and Naval ship-
yards. Hundreds of vendors are involved. The material is of varying complex-
ity and criticality. Inspection must be performed on all incoming material
to ensure that it conforms with the purchase order, or the shipment order
when forwarded by other Government activities. The amount of inspection
required should be based on the level of essentiality, the complexity of the
item, or the need for high reliability.
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Re-inspection of nonessential material is costly and unnecessary.
Establishing sampling plans is a recognized means of eliminating 100 per-
cent inspection of materials in large quantities. But, the need for high
confidence for highly essential applications, and the need to minimize the
probability of incurring expensive ripout, repair, and replacement of defec-
tive items may demand 100 percent inspection of certain materials.
By the use of modern metal identification equipment, it is relatively
easy to confirm the basic identity of all materials. Proper inspection per-
mits correlation between the actual material and the documentation submitted
to support the quality requirements. Improved non-destructive test equip-
ment such as magnetic particle and fluorescent penetrant can provide ade-
quate assurance that no significantly defective material will be accepted.
Use of written procedures for such inspection, together with written re-
cords, will increase the effectiveness of the inspection and provide a means
of confirming the quality at a later date.
When material is found that does not conform to specifications or plans,
the nature of the deficiency should be evaluated to determine whether the
material should be returned to the vendor as "non-conforming" material.
Some deficiencies are minor in nature and technical evaluation can provide
a basis for accepting non-conforming material with the assurance that the
basic quality of the completed ship will not be lowered. But, it is the
vendor's responsibility to deliver material which fully conforms <6o the
applicable specifications. Basic quality assurance policy demands positive
refusal to accept departures from those specifications.
Identification Markings .
Essential to material identification and control is that of proper identifi-




material by vendors, and by the shipyards during receipt inspection. The
requirements for Levels I and II material are permanent markings indicating
the essentiality level, material composition, specification, lot or serial
number, manufacturer's symbol, date of receipt inspection, and the number
assigned to the receipt inspector. These markings are intended to permit
traceability from the material back to the records - objective quality evi-
dence. Optional markings may be added by the shipyard to assure proper use
or application of the material. Stamps, tags, etc., are permitted for identic
fication marking of Level III material.
13
Department of the Navy, Bureau of Ships letter serial 609.1-275,
Bureau of Ships Instruction 4410.17, Material Identification System ;




Inspection has been defined as "the examination (including testing)
of supplies and services (including, when applicable, raw materials, docu-
ments, data, components, and intermediate assemblies) to determine whether
the supplies and services conform to technical requirements. The purpose of
an inspection system in the Naval shipyard is to provide uniform, systematic,
and planned inspections during the various manufacturing processes and for
acceptance of completed work.
The Inspection System .
Development of a suitable inspection system should provide for the ac-
ceptance of all conforming work or material and rejection where non-conform-
ing, should encourage the individual to improve the quality of his work,
should be easy to administer and economical in cost, and should not delay
production or impose an unreasonable and costly burden of materials handling,
inventory accumulation, etc.
Written procedures are essential to effective quality assurance in-
spection and should include:
1) designation of the inspector (s) responsible;
2) the actual inspections to be conducted;
3) the records to be maintained as evidence of inspection;
4) the acceptance standards to be used;
5) markings to identify accepted work; and
6) the equipment to be used for conducting the inspection and




The quality assurance organization must first ensure that the inspector
is qualified to conduct his assigned inspection procedures. For example,
to qualify an inspector for ultrasonic inspection of silver-brazed piping
joints, the man must take a special training course and then pass a rigid
qualification test just as the welder must be trained and qualified to
accomplish the silver-brazing operation. The necessary test equipment,
properly calibrated by one of the designated laboratories or against a
local reference standard, must be available to the inspector. Written pro-
cedures will provide the inspector with the standards of acceptance, the
markings required to identify accepted work, and the records of inspection
that are to be maintained. Use of check-off lists will help to ensure that
all required inspections have been made.
Inspections must be coordinated with the production schedule to elimin-
ate unnecessary delays. Though 100 percent inspection is required for Level
I items, statistical sampling may be suitable in other cases. Over-in-
specting will only delay production and add unnecessary costs to both the
production and inspection efforts. However, inspection should not be elimin-
ated as an expedient to meeting production schedules.
Periodic audits will assure that the inspector is qualified, inspections
are accurate, the proper test equipment is used, all necessary inspections





A major function essential to confidence in the assurance of quality is
the audit. The usual dictionary definition of the term is "a formal or
official examination and verification of accounts." As previously defined
in this paper, audit is "the analysis and evaluation of procedures, methods,
and records to determine compliance with existing requirements." In order
to be an effective tool of quality assurance, the audit process must be a
formal, planned, and systematic analysis and verification of quality by
gathering objective evidence of conformance to established standards.
Planned Audits .
The Bureau of Ships has identified quality assurance audits to be made
as:
1) those audits necessary to know what the variabilities are
that cause the distribution of quality in design, procure-
ment, and production;
2) those audits of the effectiveness of a systematically planned
action pattern which will assure these variables are identi-
fied, defined, and controlled;
3) those audits necessary to determine weak links in the
quality control exercised over the design, manufacture, test,
and use of the product;
4) those audits necessary to determine excessive specification
requirements as related to end use and product function. Here,
the Quality/Realiability Assurance Engineer starts to deter-
mine the levels of essentiality, recommend simplification of
the processes, and establish the objective quality evidence
needed to evaluate compliance to required standards; and
5) those audits necessary to determine (a) the extent and ac-
curacy of inspections made either by an inspector or by other
groups, (b) the purpose of the inspections made, (c) the ex-
tent and accuracy of inspection of the work by the worker,
(d) the extent of the inspection of the work by supervisor of
the workers who produced the job, and (e) the adequacy of in-
spection records and inspection processes used. ^
14 iDepartment of the Navy, Bureau of Ships, Quality/Reliability Assurance
Training Program Notebook (Prepared by General Dynamics, Electric Boat Divi-
sion, Groton, Connecticut; October 1962). pp. 3-18-4, 3-18-5.
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The Assurance Engineering Office of the Bureau of Ships now conducts
audits of each private and Naval shipyard building Naval ships, with particu-
lar emphasis on submarine work. In addition, the shipyards have been directed
to establish audit teams and to conduct certain audits of their own quality
systems. Audits are currently made of the following specific areas:
1. Material identification and control;
2. Non-destructive testing (NDT)
3. Fabrication of HY-80 steel;
4. Pipe welding;
5. Silver brazing;
6. Shipyard inspection system;
7. Waivers and rip-out procedures; and
8. Standardization and Calibration of inspection and measuring
instruments.
It is noted the current audit program of the Bureau of Ships does not
attempt to measure the overall effectiveness of the quality assurance plan
at a particular Naval shipyard. However, the areas which the audits now
concentrate on are those with the greatest payoff for assurance of quality
in the particular submarine which will soon be operating in an environment
of extreme sea pressure on its hull boundaries.
Planned audits determine the capability of the shipyards to perform
in accordance with the specification requirements, verify the degree of
compliance with the requirements, and show what level of confidence may be
expected in the completed ship or product. Such evaluations provide feed-
back information on specification and design deficiencies, training needs,
communication problems, manpower and skill needs, deficiencies in systematic
planning, and deficiencies in production and inspection equipments. The
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final phase of the audit function is the follow-up to ensure that corrective
action is taken in those areas where deficiencies were evident.
Certification for Sea Trials .
In 1964, certification for sea trials was made a requirement for all
new submarines. This certification defines the actions and responsibilities
required to assure that submarines under-going construction have the re-
quired hull integrity and work completeness to assure a safe and reliable
conduct of the sea trials. This requirement has reinforced the need for a
continuous, planned, and systematic quality assurance effort in that the
final certification is dependent not only upon the thoroughness and adequacy
of the final audit effort but upon the completeness and effectiveness of the
quality assurance effort throughout the entire construction period.
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COST OF QUALITY ASSURANCE
A natural and frequently expressed reaction to quality assurance is that
it increases costs. Without doubt, costs will be increased in those industri-
al activities where quality control is not normally practiced. This expecta-
tion of increased costs applies equally well to the introduction of any
management control system where none had previously existed. But, to bring
quality assurance costs into their proper perspective, it might be recognized
that the costs are devoted to knowing what level of quality is actually at-
tained as opposed to assuming the state of quality. One must then compare
the costs of achieving a specified level of quality with the total costs
when the requisite quality is not achieved.
Cost of Quality Versus Need .
Rework of preventable material failures is expensive and such costs are
measurable. However, we cannot always measure such costs as loss of combat
effectiveness, interference with operational readiness while undergoing ship-
yard or tender repair, or the effect on the logistics system. It is un-
reasonable to assume that a dollar figure could be placed on the failure which
resulted in the loss of THRESHER in April 1963. The costs of building, out-
fitting, and overhauling THRESHER can be expressed and we can also measure
the Navy's investment in the men. But we cannot put a price tag on the lives
of these men nor can we quantify the costs of possible loss of morale or
confidence within the whole of the submarine fleet as a result of this
tragedy.
The basic decision of how much quality is needed will generally be
based upon the level of essentiality or the critical characteristics of the
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product. In turn, the cost of assuring quality and reliability is dependent
upon the level of essentiality of the product. It would be rather absurd to
require the same level of quality for a ship's ice cream maker as for a main
propulsion engine. In short, the necessity for a high degree of quality and
reliability assurance in critical systems or equipment may far outweigh
the costs of assuring their quality.
The costs of assurance of quality should be weighed against the costs
of repairs should failure occur,where such costs are tangible. Statistics
available in most shipyards will provide average costs of repairs to parti-
cular shipboard equipment and systems. Failure or defect costs which must
be considered include rejected and scrapped material, repair and rework,
corrections of deficiencies after delivery, and design development or error
corrections.
Isolation of costs involved in achieving assurance of requisite quality
to prevent failures and need for repair or rework may be a more difficult
task. At the minimum, gross measures of such costs can and should be
determined and included in the process of deciding the amount and types of
inspection, tests, and documentation to be applied. The cost of assuring
quality should be commensurate with the value of the quality level achieved.
Cost effectiveness must be applied to quality assurance just as it is for
other decision making processes in the Navy.
Another factor to be considered is that when a quality-cost program is
first initiated, it will probably be found that the dollars spent in pre-
ventive effort will save many more dollars in failure costs. However, as
the program progresses and the most costly causes of failure are brought
under control, further preventive effort may not pay off at as high a ratio.
41

In time, the curve will flatten out to the point that the same level of
preventive effort can no longer be justified. Complete reporting and
analysis of quality costs will help in determining when the quality-cost
elements are in optimum balance.
Professional societies and major industry indicate that perhaps 8 to 15
percent of the total costs of their operations may be involved in assuring
delivery of high quality and reliable products to their customers. In the
aerospace industries, this cost has occasionally risen to 75 percent of the
total product cost in order to secure adequate assurance of reliability. In
the submarine construction area of the shipbuilding industry, such costs
approach 10 percent and may rise with increasingly stringent quality/reli-




People represent the most important factor responsible for the success
or failure of any quality assurance program. Nearly the total organization
must share the burden of quality. This philosophy can be implemented only
by commencing with management for communication and understanding throughout
the organization. Accordingly, the first individuals within the organiza-
tion to understand both the need for quality assurance and its implications
must be management.
Motivation and Training .
It is the responsibility of management to take steps to create an en-
vironment and motivation conducive to achieving quality. "Human experience
is full of proofs that the state of mind is of great importance in achieving
an objective.
..
quality mindedness is no exception. . .change of state of mind
always involves indoctrination." Simply telling supervisors, designers,
purchasers, mechanics, inspectors, etc., that they should strive for quality
because quality is good or because the fleet demands quality does not pro-
vide the motivational effect needed. Through a training and/or indoctrina-
tion program, the individual will learn why quality assurance is really
necessary, what part he plays in the quality assurance chain, what results
when he does not achieve the standards required of him and, most important,
he will learn how to achieve or better the standards.
The performance of personnel is variable. This variability is the
result of many personal variables such as motivation, intelligence, differ-





values, etc. The purpose of training is to develop needed attitudes, know-
ledge, and skills which will reduce the level of performance variation.
Responsibility for training falls on all levels of management. A train-
ing organization, as such, does not relieve line personnel of their responsi-
bilities for determining training needs as well as planning and executing
those activities necessary for supplying these needs.
Training is generally considered a tool for teaching skills. In the
quality assurance program, training must also be directed toward motivating
the individual to reach high quality goals at all times. However, the source
of motivation must not be ceased upon doling out a certificate of completion
of training. There must be an ongoing program to remind the individual of
the need for quality. Quality workmanship or performance should be recognized
and rewarded. Every effort should be made to exploit the natural aspiration
of an individual to do a job well. Group influence on the individual must
not be neglected.
Zero Defects Program
"Zero Defects" is a motivation program aimed at making members of the
military and industrial complex more quality conscious and dedicated to the
goal of doing every job right the first time. The Bureau of Ships initiated
a Zero Defects Program in January 1965 for application in the shipyards and
other manufacturing activities. The overall objective is to motivate the
individual to do the job right the first time. To this end, the individual
will be made aware of the importance of his work to the overall success of
1 6
Department of the Navy, Bureau of Ships Instruction 4120.15, "Pride"




the Navy mission. He will also be informed of the relationship of quality
workmanship to his job security.
Individual and group recognition will be provided for good workmanship,
and a spirit of teamwork will be developed among individuals and groups to
promote good work. The success of the program is to be measured in terms of
reduced cost and improved quality of products.
The zero defects goal is seemingly impossible. However, many industrial
organizations have introduced the basic concepts of the zero defects program
under various names and significant results have been achieved. The theme
of this program is prevention of defects rather than detection of defects.
Doing the job right in the first place would result in tremendous savings of
time and resources if scrap, rework, and modification were eliminated. Sav-
ings, cost reduction, and cost avoidances resulting from zero defects programs
will be reported as reduced operating costs under the Cost Reduction Program
of the Department of Defense.
The error-cause elimination feature of the zero defects program is
vital to its success. Both the design engineer and the man on the produc-
tion line have a part to play in identifying and eliminating errors. The
engineer must make sure that the requirements that he establishes are real-
istic. Producibility and performance in accordance with the needs of the user
or the level of essentiality must be provided, without demanding something
that is more sophisticated, more costly, and more difficult to build than
necessary. Any deviation from this realistic approach can only result in
increasing the probability of defects and the cost of rework or scrap.
The mechanic, welder, or electrician carrying out the production tasks
are expected to respond quickly and effectively to error-cause elimination
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when his recommendations are sought on ways to turn out a consistently defect-
free product. Not only will the recommendations be helpful but the spirit of
cooperation and working together to produce a quality and economical pro-
duct will be motivating forces.
Once in full operation, the zero defects program is intended to be sus-
tained by periodic review with, and motivation of, all personnel. Accomplish-
ments in terms of defect trends, dollars saved, and schedules met will be
published and discussed in group meetings. The individual must be made to
feel that these are, in part, his accomplishments, that he plays a part in
the future of the shipyard, and that its future is important to him.
The zero defects program will re-emphasize pride in performance and pride
in product. Being slanted toward the individual, no one is to be excluded
since quality of the end product is everyone's business. Success of the
program must stem from its acceptance by the most basic element of the organiza-
tion - the individual. The aim is to motivate by challenging, educating, and





The modern, complex, and high performance Naval ships being delivered
to the fleet today by our shipyards can be expected to operate under highly
adverse conditions. It is necessary to know beforehand that they will per-
form, or even survive, prior to subjecting them to such as the extreme sea
pressure on the hull boundaries of the modern submarine at design depth. Our
ships may have to endure such unusual hardships as typhoons and collisions.
It must be remembered that, though being designed and built in peactime, the
ships in the fleet represent preparedness for war. In the event of war, they
must be able to carry out their missions in the face of long periods of
steaming at high speed, bomb hits and near misses, depth charge shock, and
the other hazards of battle.
It is necessary to instill confidence within the fleet that the ships
being built - and overhauled and repaired - in our shipyards will perform
safely and reliably. Objective evidence of quality is required in critical
areas. The quality assurance program instituted by the Bureau of Ships in
November 1960 is intended to provide the necessary assurance that the stand-
ards of quality are being met. Significant progress has been achieved, but
the fact remains that this is a new and complex program that is not uniformly
implemented in the organizations concerned with the design, construction, over-
haul, and repair of Naval ships.
Quality is considered to be that which is established by standard pro-
cedures and methods to result in a physical product. Quality assurance, on
the other hand, is comprised of all the actions necessary to provide adequate
confidence that the product will perform operationally as intended.
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The first step in the quality assurance program is to develop a formal
plan which unites the efforts of the organizations and personnel toward the
common goal of adequate quality. The plan should be based on what must be
done, where it must be done, who will do it, who will check that it is done
right, and how personnel will be trained and motivated to carry the plan out.
Master charts of responsibilities and schedules will serve both as a plan and
as a tool of managerial control. The plan should provide for audits to show
whether or not it is being carried out.
The planned sequence of quality assurance events should be integrated
with organizational planning to establish the authority and responsibility
centers for the design, procurement, production, and inspection actions*
The Bureau of Ships has given the Shipyard Commanders the option of
establishing the primary quality assurance organization at either the depart-
ment level or as a division of the Production Department. Appendix I lists
the duties and responsibilities of the Quality Assurance Department. Where
established at the division level, the Quality Assurance Officer has line
responsibility to the Production Officer and staff responsibility to the
Shipyard Commander. Both systems of organization exist in the shipyard family,
as well as other variations.
Textbook principles of organization would demand placing the quality
assurance function at the department level reporting to the Shipyard Commander.
This was also the opinion of the court which inquired into the circumstances
of the loss of THRESHER. However, it is necessary to face up to the fact
U. S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Loss of the U.S.S.
"THRESHER" , Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 88th
Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, June 26, 27, July 23, 1963, and July 1,
1964 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 153.
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that the Naval shipyards are under the management of Naval officers with
dual positions in the shipyard hierarchy in terms of rank and organizational
position. A Navy Commander may be the most effective on a daily basis in
his interactions with the Planning and Supply Departments (headed by Capt-
ains) where he has been assigned as head of the Quality Assurance Division
and has gained the full support of the Production Officer (a senior Captain).
The personalities of the officers concerned could be the deciding factor as
to the most effective organization in a particular shipyard at a particular
time. But, what happens when the policy of rotation results in different
officers in these positions?
Where the demand for quality emanates from the Shipyard Commander, a
Navy Commander who is qualified in quality assurance should be able to ex-
ercise the necessary influence to be effective as head of the Quality As-
surance Department. This would remove the Production Officer from the
position of deciding whether to waive quality requirements in favor of com-
pleting ships on schedule. The problem is then in the hands of the Ship-
yard Commander where it properly belongs.
Now that the amount of submarine construction is starting to decline at
the Mare Island and Portsmouth Naval Shipyards, it would seem that the numbers
of quality assurance personnel should be reduced in some proportion to the
declining workload. At least, this is a proper period of time for the manage-
ment of these shipyards to sit back and objectively reevaluate their Quality
Assurance Divisions in terms of objectives, effectiveness and efficiency,
span of control of quality related functions, and numbers of personnel re-
quired to do the job right. Production, design or supply functions which may
have been transferred to the Quality Assurance Division in the face of dynamic
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expansion and the urgent need for quality, as was further emphasized by the
loss of THRESHER, should be returned to line supervision. Personnel should
be reduced in the areas where the need can no longer be adequately justified.
It is understood that a study of this general nature has been, or is being,
undertaken at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. Analysis of the Portsmouth study
may assist the remaining shipyards in their own review of objectives and
plans to meet the goals of quality assurance.
The basic job of design is to make and disseminate decisions that will
result in the desired end product characteristics at reasonable cost. In
order to make intelligent decisions, the designer must have the necessary
experience and training. He must be kept abreast of the state-of-the-art
developments in materials, manufacturing processes, and inspection techni-
ques. He must be able to identify the critical characteristics of the
particular item to establish the criteria for its procurement, job orders,
manufacture, inspection and test. The designer also needs feedback from
inspection and from the fleet for analysis of defects and failures to im-
prove his design decisions in the future.
The assurance of quality in the design phase is achieved through the
use of models and mockups, by design checks and review, and by preproduction
or preinstallation tests. Design review is one of the most powerful tools
available to quality assurance management to assure that reliability, level
of essentiality, and other important design factors are considered early in
the design. Planned and formal quality assurance review and audits of de-
sign are not yet being conducted in some shipyards.
Design's definition of the product in terms of plans, specifications,
and inspections must be clear and complete so that procurement, production,
and inspection personnel are operating from the same standards. In order to
establish the critical parameters of the item, design must first determine:
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1) What would be the result of failure of the item?
2) What are the minimum requirements for a reliable design?
3) How likely is the item to fail under various alternatives
of design and safety factors.
4) Is there redundnacy?
5) How much will inspection cost? An alternative to 1007o in-
spection may be overdesign.
In the process of deciding the answers to the above questions, the
designer must establish the level of essentiality of the item relative to
stress levels, the effect of failure on mission or combat effectiveness,
and the effect on safety of the ship and its personnel.
Level I represents those systems for which maximum confidence is requir-
ed. Such confidence is to be derived from as firm a base of factual in-
formation as is practicable. In short, Level I requires a complete, docu-
mented, and verifiable quality assurance effort. Level II requires less
effort in verification of materials while Level III requires a minimum of
checks and assurance.
The Bureau of Ships appears to have created confusion when they provided
an option of classifying piping systems on a two level essentiality criteria
or retaining the original three levels. The result has been lack of uniform-
ity which can create problems where there is an exchange of plans, locally
prepared specifications, and material between the shipyards. Then too, even
with the guidelines provided the shipyards relative to piping systems, there
is not uniformity in the assignment of essentiality levels to particular
piping systems in the ships. To reduce the problems of shipyard management
of quality assurance based on level of essentiality criteria, the best solu-
tion appears to be adoption of a uniform two level system.
To date, the Bureau of Ships has provided guidelines for assignment of
levels of essentiality to piping and hull material and processes. Except for
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unusually critical exceptions, similar guidelines have not yet been definiti-
zed for electrical and mechanical equipment and systems. Assignments now
being made in the shipyards are not uniform and result in varying degrees of
inspection, standards of acceptance, and assurance.
Feedback is represented by a closed loop information system through
which specific quality results are measured, analyzed, and fed back to the
proper organizational components of the total quality assurance system.
Feedback of defect and failure information provides a basis for effecting
corrective action in the responsible design, material, manufacture, or in-
spection area. Though there are a number of formal feedback systems which
provide failure information on equipment and systems in the fleet, reports
of material failures and defects tend to be sporadic. Reports that are made
must be delivered to the individuals cognizant over quality in each case
for analysis and initiation of corrective actions where definitely required.
The basic areas for control of vendor supplied materials are proper pre-
paration and review of purchase specifications, proper selection of capable
vendors, clarification of quality requirements, source inspection, and ade-
quate shipyard receiving inspection. Clarification of quality requirements
and adequate shipyard receiving inspection necessarily applies to critical
materials received from Government activities as well as from commercial
vendors. Waiver of specifications and non-conforming material must not be
condoned since they lower the standards of quality efforts. Identification
markings are used to assure proper use or application of material and to per-
mit traceability back to the quality documentation.
An inspection system provides uniform, systematic, and planned inspec-
tions during the various manufacturing processes and inspection and test of
completed work. The designated inspector must be trained and qualified, his
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test equipment must be properly calibrated, and he should have written pro-
cedures which show the standards of acceptance and the records to be maintain-
ed. Over- inspection and uncoordinated inspection will delay production and
add unnecessary costs. Inspection must not be waived as an expedient to
meeting production schedules.
Inspection is the process of evaluating the quality of the item produced.
Quality assurance audit is the process of analyzing and evaluating quality
procedures, methods, and records for the purpose of determining compliance
with requirements. Through sampling, audits will provide the assurance that
policies, instructions, and procedures are carried out as intended in all
functional areas from design to final test. Or, the audit process may be
used to evaluate a critical area of the quality system such as non-des-
tructive testing or material identification and control.
The Bureau of Ships is conducting audits of specific areas which provide
the greatest contribution to the quality of submarines. In most cases, these
audits are also applicable to surface ships. However, there is no attempt
to measure the overall effectiveness of the quality assurance plan at the
Naval shipyards though this is the intent of pre-award quality assurance
audits now being conducted in commercial shipyards.
The Naval shipyards have also developed audit teams for self evalua-
tion. Members of the shipyard teams are subject to assignment to the Bureau
of Ships audit team.
Gaining an understanding of the benefits to be realized from practical
implementation of the quality assurance program in the shipyards should at
least alleviate the first serious obstacle - increased cost . Since there has
been an increase in emphasis on the need for always meeting specifications,
53

the initial effect was increase in costs due to increased inspection ef-
fort with an associated increase in detection and ripping out of unsatis-
factory work in order to deliver ships which met the required standards.
The quality assurance program was developed to assure quality workmanship
and material and to prevent the need for rework. Rework is at least an
order of magnitude more expensive than doing the job right in the first
place. A few serious material replacement programs will pay the cost of an
adequate quality assurance program. The theme of quality assurance is
"prevention, not detection."
The cost of quality must be commensurate with the value of the quality
achieved. The costs of effecting levels of quality in ships, and their
equipment and systems, must be subjected to value analysis studies. Stand-
ards and specifications must be met on each and every job, but complete
inspection and verification of quality is not required for the greater
majority of ship work. Where we are concerned with critical equipment,
systems, and processes with high levels of essentiality in terms of physical
stress, mission, and safety, we must consider intangible as well as tangible
costs of material failures. The decision as to the level of quality must
be based on the answer to the question, "What happens if we do not have
adequate assurance?" In many cases, the decision must be to take every
possible action to secure complete assurance of quality with the Navy being
prepared to accept the costs of obtaining such confidence.
Too often, there is the feeling in our shipyards that Navy specifica-
tions are a desirable goal rather than a firm requirement. There are oc-
currences of lack of understanding as to what the specification require-
ments are and why it is important that they be met. In some instances, it
has been impracticable to conform to particular specification requirements
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and individuals have taken it upon themselves to waive the requirements
without feeding back either the problem or their decisions to proceed.
All of these things have brought about deterioration of quality under the
pressure of production schedules and cost reduction drives, and because of
inadequate quality assurance programs.
Formal training in the aspects and purpose of quality assurance in
our shipyards has been limited since the program is still relatively new.
But, the shipyards should increase their quality assurance orientation pro-
grams. Simply telling the craftsmen that "this is the way the job must be
done" will not achieve its purpose. The craftsman must also know why it is
so important that the job must be done that way. It is necessary to im-
prove present conditions by publicizing quality assurance policy, by orienta-
tion courses, by taking a firm stand on quality from the top of the organiza-
tions to the bottom, and by getting across the need for doing the job right
the first time.
The zero defects program can be an important booster to quality assur-
ance efforts to motivate everyone to get the job done right - the first
time. The overall plan of the shipyard should be to build the zero defects
program with the intention of sustaining it. It should be sold to the ship-
yard employees with a sincere and honest approach and should not be over-
promoted initially. New employees should be indoctrinated in the program
as they are hired. Merely spending money on the program will not be nearly
as effective as management support, supervisory follow-up, and proper acknow-
ledgement of individual and group achievement. The magnitude of the task of
planning, implementing, and sustaining the program could easily be under-
estimated.
Based on inspection evidence that many specification requirements were
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not being met, the Chief, Bureau of Ships has stated:
It is my policy that ships will be built, converted, repaired,
and overhauled in conformance with the specifications. .. .Specifica-
tions are not to be considered as desirable goals which should be _
met but rather as minimum standards which must be met or exceeded.
This statement implies only one level of quality: 100%. When plans and
specifications are met on the job, the result is quality no matter what de-
gree of inspection or assurance of quality is used. Just because no in-
spection or no quality assurance documentation is designated for a parti-
cular job does not mean that it is not important. An attitude of pride in
workmanship and meeting all specifications on every job will reduce shipyard
costs as well as increase the confidence of the fleet in the capabilities of
our shipyards. The goal in each construction or overhaul effort must be
"a ship's worth of confidence."
2
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QUALITY AND RELIABILITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT 1
Quality and Reliability Assurance Officer
The Quality and Reliability Assurance Officer is responsible to the
Shipyard Commander for the organization, administration, and supervision of
the Quality and Reliability Assurance Department, and for such other work as
may be assigned by the Shipyard Commander.
Duties
Planning, executing, and monitoring a quality and reliability assurance
program for the shipyard; guidance, integration, and evaluation of the ef-
forts of the Shipyard towards the prevention of defective quality and re-
liability; investigation and evaluation of quality and reliability problems
to determine the fundamental cause, the cost, the scope, and the signifi-
cance of the problem; maintaining standards of measurement and performing
calibration; developing a quality and reliability assurance functions such
as inspections, physical and chemical tests, qualification tests, nondes-
tructive tests, witnessing of formal operational tests as assigned; failure
mode and effect analysis, reliability prediction analysis, maintainability
analysis and process capability studies; technical requirements for metal
fabrication and thermal joining processes; execution of such research,
development, test and evaluation programs as are assigned. However, in
shipyards with a Nuclear Power Division, quality assurance for nuclear
reactor plants is the responsibility of the Nuclear Power Superintendent as
assigned in Article 620H.
Organization
The organization of the Quality and Reliability Assurance Department
consists of:




(d) Metals Fabrication Division.
Chief Quality and Reliability Assurance Engineer .
The Chief Quality and Reliability Assurance Engineer is responsible to
the Quality and Reliability Assurance Officer for the efficient performance
and coordination of all activities of the Quality and Reliability Assur-
ance Department. He is the principal advisor to the Quality and Reliability
Assurance Officer on administrative and technical matters.
Department of the Navy, Bureau of Ship-, Instruction 5450. 14A. Stand -
ard U. S. Naval Shipyard Regulations . (Washington: 18 March 1958).
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Quality and Reliability Assurance Engineering and Analysis Division
The Head of the Quality and Reliability Assurance Engineering and
Analysis Division is responsible to the Quality and Reliability Assurance
Officer for:
(a) Coordinating, planning, executing and monitoring a systematic,
comprehensive, and economical quality and reliability assurance program for
the shipyards.
(b) Investigation of quality and reliability problems to ascer-
tain their cause, cost and scope, evaluating their significance, and recom-
mending corrective action.
(c) Developing an integrated plan for a Shipyard program for the
prevention of quality and reliability defects.
(d) Coordinating the development of standards for quality of work
for assurance of applicability, adequacy and economy.
(e) Developing a quality and reliability assurance indoctrination
and training program for the shipyard.
(f) Knowing the latest quality and reliability measurement devel-
opments, applications and technologies and initiate their use where appli-
cable.
(g) Coordinating and administering quality and reliability assur-
ance surveys within the Shipyard.
(h) Coordinating and participating in the evaluation of contractor's
quality and reliability assurance systems for complex items procured by the
Shipyard.
(i) Perform failure mode and effect analysis.
(j) Perform reliability prediction analysis.
(k) Perform maintainability analysis.
(1) Perform process capability studies.
Inspection Division
The Head of the Inspection Division is responsible to the Quality and
Reliability Assurance Officer for:
(a) Directing the preparation and issuance of inspection instruc-
tions specifying the types and frequencies of inspections to be performed to
assure conformance to prescribed standards of quality.
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(b) Conducting or witnessing assigned tests and inspections in
accordance with paragraph a.
(c) Transmitting and amplifying to the inspectors the applicable
criteria for acceptance or rejection.
(d) Identifying those areas where acceptance criteria are not de-
finitive and initiating action to obtain clear criteria.
(e) Developing and implementing specific methods and procedures
for inspection data collection, tabulation, analysis and dissemination in
order to identify quality problems and indicate quality levels.
Laboratory Division
The Head of the Laboratory Division is responsible to the Quality and
Reliability Assurance Officer for:
(a) Providing scientific and technological service and guidance
to the Shipyard.
(b) Directing Instrument Calibration Programs for measuring and
testing equipment.
(c) Performing those quality and reliability assurance tests and
actions which require laboratory or scientific services.
(d) Conducting assigned research, development, tests and evaluation
programs as directed.
Metal Fabrication Division
The Head of the Metal Fabrication Division is responsible to the
Quality and Reliability Assurance Officer for:
(a) Technical requirements for processes involving the fabrica-
tion of joining of metals, such as bending, forming, welding, and silver
brazing.
(b) Establishing and interpreting standards for quality of work
in the metal fabrication and joining processes.
(c) Establishing of qualification requirements for mechanics and
equipment in the metal fabrication and joining processes.
(d) Development or improvement of welding methods, materials,
processes, practices and equipment.
(e) Prescribe preventive requirements to minimize quality de-
fects in the fabrication or joining of metals.
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